

Rhetoric and Ethic: A Riposte

First of all I want to thank Prof. Duane Watson and the Steering Committee of the Rhetoric and the New Testament section for organizing this session on my book Rhetoric and Ethic. I accepted this invitation grateful for the opportunity to enter into a substantive discussion with scholars in the field of rhetorical Christian Testament studies. The responses of Professors Hester-Amador and Robbins attempt a dialogical engagement with my work and I greatly appreciate their careful reading of the book. While I am not able to adequately all the numerous questions their close reading has engendered I will attempt to clarify some of the substantive theoretical issues they have raised.

The three responses are quite different in character and raise so many important issues that it has been difficult for me to crystallize my response.¹ It seems to me that for the most part all four of us share an understanding of rhetorical studies but that we come from quite different theoretical and ideological or theological perspectives, which makes the understanding of each other difficult. If we had followed Prof. Amador's suggestion to engage in a dialogue, we might have been able to work through all the questions. But let me state from the outset that I want here to focus on issues of rhetoric and Christian Testament studies rather than on feminist theoretical debates.

We seem to have in common that none of us comes with a passion for reinscribing antiquarian school book rhetoric which as the "calisthenics of manhood." was according to Maud Gleason² crucial to the process of elite male socialization in antiquity. Those of us who are members of the Internet rhetoric group have witnessed in the past weeks an intense debate on ancient rhetorical handbooks, genre, and the validity of studying Paul's letters as ancient oratory. While reading these exchanges and

remaining on the margins of the discussion I was wondering whether our conversation today also would get bogged down in the quagmire of ancient school rhetoric. I am grateful to the respondents that this is not the case.

Although in Rhetoric and Ethic I am aware of this technical approach to rhetorical studies, I am not primarily interested in refining this discussion of ancient rhetorical categories. Rather I want to intervene in a broader conversation on rhetorical discourse and its public political functions in antiquity and today. Like Foucault I seek to transform the discourse of biblical studies and to investigate the relation between this academic discourse and **its** implications for “the broad social, political and historical areas”³ in which it is located and which permeate its texts.

In sum, I am not concerned with rhetorical classification but with epistemological questions and theoretical frameworks. As Prof. Robbins correctly has recognized, Rhetoric and Ethic therefore is not primarily exegetical although it is that too. Its central concern, I submit, however, is also not primarily theological as Prof. Robbins suggests, even though it has one explicit chapter on the construction of biblical theology. Rather, I suggest, the book argues for re-conceptualizing the disciplinary discourses of biblical studies as rhetoric and ideology critique.

I will begin with Prof. Amador’s final question that asks “Who is your audience?” In contrast to some of my other works this book is not primarily addressed to either a feminist scholarly or popular audience. Rather Rhetoric and Ethic seeks to intervene in interdisciplinary academic discourses in general and is addressed to my colleagues in biblical studies in particular and it does so from the social location of critical feminist studies. The book’s germinating beginning was my SBL presidential address in which I called both for a decentering of the positivist-scientistic self-understanding of biblical scholarship to be able to hear and act on the questions raised

by those of us who are on its margins and call for a transformation of the whitemale-stream discourses of the discipline. In response to Prof. Amador's concern that terms such as "malestream" or "white-malestream" are exclusive of white males like him, I want to stress again that I use such terms in a historical-descriptive way. As I pointed out in the very beginning of the book, without question theological and biblical studies as public discourses have been exclusive of wo/men not only by (church) law but also by disciplinary academic measures. For the most part of Western history they have been articulated by elite white western (clergy) men. If scholars continue to produce such silencing discourses then they –whether male or female, white or black, western or eastern - are part of this elite white malestream academic tradition. If they do not want to continue this tradition, they need to name and indict the hegemonic discourses of domination and exclusion. Hence, it is important to see that I do not understand race, gender, or class as essentialist but as political categories.

Prof. Amador asks rhetorically: What do we do with those who don't embrace the [emancipatory] paradigm? For example, what happens to those scholars who continue to adhere to malestream scholarship? I am tempted to point out the obvious: they will be recognized as leading and respected scholars in the field because they sustain the center over and against the voices from the margins. Success is most likely to "happen to them." The right-wing corruption of language has managed to suggest that those who in defense of the status quo perpetrate the marginalization, silencing, and vilification of so-called academic or religious "heretics" are the "victims" of those marginalized, silenced and dispossessed.

On a panel exploring the public character of biblical scholarship at the beginning of this annual meeting Prof. Fernando Segovia took the temperature of the discipline by asking how much has changed and how much has stayed the same since 1987. In a

careful analysis of my presidential address he explored this question in terms of the social location, ethos and politics of biblical studies and elaborated how much change has taken place. A cursory look at the program book for this annual meeting and a comparison with the programs of 20 years ago can document his point. On the other hand he also questioned how deep an inroad feminist studies, minority studies and Third World studies actually have made. He states:

I would immediately grant that questions of ethics and politics have not moved to the center of the discipline. Can one really say, as one should, that criticism has become fully self-critical regarding its own foundations and practice? Can one actually claim, as one should, that scholarship now regards issues of power and valuation as fundamental to its task? I do not think so. In fact, certain enduring conditions prove troubling.⁴

He goes on to point to three areas of such trouble: the first concerns disciplinary socialization in doctoral programs, the second has to do with historical criticism and its failure to be re-conceptualized in rhetorical terms, and the third concerns the place of biblical studies in the curriculum as well as biblical students' ability to do interdisciplinary intellectual work. In light of Prof. Humphrey's judgmental rhetoric I would add as a fourth area of concern: the corruption of language by right-wing religious discourses that have co-opted the languages of freedom, love, liberation, and democracy for sustaining situations of domination.

Since none of the respondents has presented my argument in its entirety, I need to give a condensed outline of Ethic and Rhetoric. I apologize to those in the audience who have read the book if I am somewhat repetitive so that those can follow the discussion who did not yet have the chance to read the book. In line with my presidential address which is reprinted as the first chapter the book's aim is to explore

the theoretical and practical obstacles that stand in the way of the transformation of positivist-antiquarian, allegedly value-neutral, disinterested scholarship into a scientific discipline that is truly critical, emancipatory and conscious of its rhetoricity and rhetoricality. Hence, the first part of the book explores the theoretical parameters of such a rhetorical-ethical paradigm shift, whereas the second part seeks to exemplify such a paradigm shift at work by a close reading and hermeneutical discussion of Pauline texts.

The second chapter elaborates the three major research paradigms of biblical studies, - the doctrinal-theological, the scientific –positivistic, and the hermeneutical-cultural paradigms in order to situate and position the emerging 4th rhetorical emancipatory paradigm. In the third chapter I go on to inquire into the politics of biblical studies by exploring the public-rhetorical character of both religious and theological studies. If there is no “god’s eye view” knowledge and presupposition less intellectual inquiry then both religious and theological studies must critically reflect on their own social locations and political functions.

Rather than just to see theological studies (in the broadest sense of the word) as a committed and interested discipline, one must recognize that biblical studies done in the history of religions and religious studies mode is just as much determined by the intellectual politics of the academy as theological studies are determined by institutionalized religions. Both ask for critical rhetorical and ethical inquiry of their intellectual and interpretive practices. The difference between the academic and religious discourses in biblical studies is not that one is value-neutral and disinterested whereas the other is not. Rather their different institutional locations and disciplinary pressures constitute the difference.

However, one must not overlook that theological studies done within a university rather than a seminary context are sometimes better equipped to raise questions of emancipation, power interests, accountability, and the purpose of scholarship insofar as such studies occupy a social location in-between academy and church/ synagogue/ mosque, university and religious communities. However, this does not mean, as Prof. Amador seems to think and Prof. Humphrey asserts, that one has to be a member of a faith community and subscribe to its doctrinal “story” in order to engage in theological biblical studies.

The fourth and last chapter in the theoretical part of the book addresses the question as to why rhetoric scholarship in biblical studies for the most part has not been able to recognize and acknowledge its own rhetoricity and rhetoricality as well as to affirm its ideology-critical function but is in danger to remain caught in an antiquarian positivist ghetto. Utilizing feminist gender analysis I explore the construal of religion and rhetoric in modernity. Because religion and rhetoric are seen in feminine cultural terms biblical studies in general and biblical rhetorical studies in particular continue to be fascinated by ancient rhetoric. They need such a “calisthenics of masculinity” in order to prove that biblical criticism is a “hard,” masculine, reified science.

The second part of the book goes on to explore the ways that Pauline texts, particularly 1 Corinthians, can be read differently in a rhetorical-emancipatory paradigm of biblical studies. In chapters 5 - 8 I seek to develop a theoretical model of rhetorical analysis, explore the rhetoricity of historical knowledge, and attempt an ideology-critical feminist discussion and reading of Gal 3:28. Finally, the last chapter asks how to theoretically frame and construct biblical theology as a field of study in such a way that its rhetorical character comes to the fore. In short, the audiences for this

book are my students and colleagues in biblical and religious-theological studies as well as those interested in interdisciplinary questions.

On the one hand, since the questions, which were raised by my conversation partners - with the exception of those of Prof. Humphrey - focus on the first part and overall project of the book, I will attempt to crystallize some of the underlying theoretical issues. On the other hand, since it has become common sense that texts have multiple meanings and cannot be reduced to one single definite "true" meaning, I will not enter into an exegetical debate to defend my interpretation as the only correct one, but rather will focus on the theoretical aspects of the issues in question. Though before I can do so, I need to point out that the rhetorical genre of Prof. Humphrey's response entitled "The Hegemony of 'Liberation'" is quite different from the dialogical approach of the other two. It does not invite dialogue but disapproval and misunderstanding. I am sorry to note that the anti-feminist discourse *a la* Paglia or Sommers has finally arrived at the annual SBL meeting in theological dress!

Prof. Humphrey's presentation displays subtle rhetorical refinement by deploying allusion, insinuation, quoting out of context, and subsuming my argument under antiquarian rhetorical terms. Her response does not take the form of a dialogue but that of a rhetorical exercise that frames its argument with the help of ancient rhetorical categories as *exordium*, *narratio*, and *confirmatio*, with two subsections on method and exegesis, in order to indict the "hegemony of liberation."

This form of rhetoric, which, as I have noticed above, Maud Gleason has characterized as the "calisthenics of manhood", allows her to frame her argument in defense of the hegemonic Christian story. And - consciously or not- she does so by resorting to the traditional, often unspoken, kyriocentric trope of the "good" and "bad" wo/man which is a staple of ancient and modern rhetoric. However, Prof. Humphrey

does not explicitly mark this rhetorical pattern that she inscribes but works by insinuation and sarcasm. The “bad” wo/man says "I" [to quote her: “For everywhere the first person prevails. (‘my own work,’ ‘my discussion,’ ‘my presidential address,’ ‘my marginalization’)], subscribes to power and seeks hegemony. She is self-absorbed rather than self-effacing and self-sacrificing, pushy rather than humble, uppity rather than obedient, challenging the tradition rather than upholding it, rejecting self-sacrifice and suffering rather than practicing it as Christian virtue, insisting on critical inquiry rather than on story, ecstasy, and concourse. No wonder that Prof. Humphrey has to clearly distance herself as the “good” and “faithful” wo/man from the author of Rhetoric and Ethic.

Since according to Adrienne Rich the “good” wo/man has the function to uphold civilization, I perfectly understand the interests that such rhetoric serves. What I resent is its subtle manipulation that “blames the victim” for promoting hegemony, exclusion and violence, a trope which also comes to the fore in Prof. Amador’s Nietzschean reference to “the penchant of the dispossessed (the proletariat) toward fascism, slave morality, and resentment.” It also comes to the fore in Prof. Robbins example that trivializes violence against wo/men: “...if a person was born and raised in a family where one’s mother physically and mentally abused one’s father....” This is to blatantly disregard feminist research of the last 20 years and the sociological data, which have documented beyond a doubt that men against wo/men and children and not the other way around generally perpetuate such death-dealing violence!

After having identified the rhetorical trope of the “good” and “bad” wo/man and the rhetorical practice of “blaming” the victim, I do not want to respond either defensively or antagonistically. I simply want to point out its location in the rhetoric of dominance with its violent consequences. When I was working on this response the NY

Times had a report on honor killings stating that thousands of wo/men are murdered each year because they have been branded as “bad wo/men.” Their fathers or brothers for acts that are seen as besmirching the honor of the family kill them.

The issues and questions raised by Prof. Amador do not circle around theological ethic but in my opinion around the dangerous liaison between postmodernism and feminism. Whereas my critical feminist liberationist position and the arguments for it are widely published and well known, my stance towards postmodernism is less well understood. I have acknowledged that postmodernism has learnt much from feminism and vice versa. My difficulty is not with all forms of postmodernism but with the particular form of postmodern feminism that celebrates multiplicity and heterogeneity but eschews value judgments (or judicial rhetoric). It is obvious that the difference between Prof. Amador and myself is a difference in theoretical framework. Whereas he seems to rely on a postmodern analysis of history and power I am clearly indebted to a feminist movement for change and justice. Consequently, my work cannot be understood if one does not accept a systemic analysis of domination, which I have theorized as kyriarchy.

Foucault and his students have elaborated that discursive formations such as historiography or biblical studies determine the production of knowledge. They are intimately bound up with non-discursive factors defined as institutional field, set of events, practices, political decisions, and economic processes. Hence, discursive analysis seeks to examine the ways power/knowledge complexes operate at a micro-social level in order to produce regimes of truth. In his essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault therefore attacks the traditional forms of history, which he sees as dominated by a certain metaphysics of presence and totalizing assumptions derived from the philosophy of the subject. While I appreciate a Foucauldian discourse analysis, I am not

convinced that his critique of the subject applies to wo/men who have not been “autonomous and sovereign subjects.”

Over and against the structuralist postmodern destabilization and erasure of the subject, feminist and other liberationist scholars have pointed out that such a destabilization of the subject and its erasure is advocated by some forms of postmodernism precisely at a moment when the subjugated in history are insisting on being recognized as subjects and historical agents. Whereas the elite white Western male subject needs to be destabilized, the silenced and forgotten in history need to find their own voice and to reconstruct history as their own memory of agency.

In her article “When the Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-Vision,” published in 1971, Adrienne Rich explicitly reflects on the importance of the newly emerging wo/men’s liberation movement for the writer and historical consciousness. The difference between a postmodern and a critical feminist emancipatory theory of the subject can be illustrated with the following statement:

The sleepwalkers are coming awake, and for the first time the awakening has a collective reality; it is no longer such a lonely thing to open one’s eyes.

Re-vision – the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new critical direction -- is for wo/men more than a chapter in cultural history: it is an act of survival. Until we can understand the assumptions in which we are drenched we cannot know ourselves. And this drive to self-knowledge, for wo/men, is more than a search for identity: it is part of our refusal of the self-destructiveness of [elite white] male-dominated society. A radical critique of literature [or history, theology, religion, ethics], feminist in its impulse, would take the work first of all as a clue to how we live, how we have been living, how we have been led to imagine ourselves, how our language has

trapped a well as liberated us, how the very act of naming has been till now a [elite white] male prerogative, and how we can begin to see and name -- and therefore live -- afresh.... We need to know the writing of the past, and know it differently than we have ever known it; not to pass on a tradition but to break its hold over us. ⁵

Prof. Amador correctly observes that I continue to adhere to a metaphysics of presence and that it is important for me to assert that radical democratic equality has been not only possible but also has been partially realized in history. Yet, while acknowledging that I maintain the rhetoricity of all historiography, he goes on to say that “history as a positivist empirical claim continues as a fundamental aspect of biblical interpretation” in my project. Rather than understanding history as positivist, I argue, that history is both an ideological narrative construction and the actual site of struggle for justice.

I do not quite know what Prof. Amador actually means by a “metaphysical division of language and reality.” What my work has underscored again and again is the obfuscating ideological function androcentric- or better kyriocentric - language performs. Moreover, I do not speak about history in universalist terms but about the history of those who have had no written history and were written out of history although they were historical agents and subjects. To respond here to one of Prof. Robbins questions: Such a reconstruction of the history of social movements for justice cannot but always also be at one and the same time a reconstruction of the history of the winners. But this history has to be reconstructed in different terms. Because Prof. Amador reads my text in a certain postmodern fashion, he is not able to recognize that the emancipatory paradigm replaces the value free paradigm not only at the level of ethics but also at all other rhetorical levels.

A second set of Prof. Amador's questions circles around value-neutrality and the erasure of the boundary between religious studies and theological studies. He is nervous that such a breakdown will be exclusive of scholars like him whose efforts are not directed toward a religious community. In light of Prof. Humphrey's emphatic conclusion of her paper I fully understand his anxiety. Nevertheless, what I am advocating is not the erasure of the difference and distinctiveness of religious and theological studies but rather I argue for the recognition that both are done from a certain social-location that is not value-neutral and disinterested. If theological studies are in danger to be determined by the doctrinal interests and institutional pressures of religious institutions, religious studies are equally subject to the disciplinary pressures of the academy. The difference between the rhetorical emancipatory paradigm and the dogmatic-theological as well as the scientific positivist and the hermeneutical-cultural ones is exactly its emancipatory rhetorical character. Whereas Prof. Amador fears that the emancipatory –rhetorical paradigm will form its own institutions, I do all that I can to promote such institutional practices. If the traditional paradigms of biblical studies derive their power from their institutional location, it is absolutely necessary that the rhetorical-emancipatory paradigm develop institutions that engender power for justice and liberation. However, one must not mistake the emancipatory paradigm as a paradigm of advocacy for certain groups and against others. Rather the primary task of scholars in the emancipatory paradigm in my opinion is to analyze the discourses of domination and to identify and articulate discourses of emancipation.

Prof. Robbins' and my own interests meet in our passion for developing a model of biblical studies that is interdisciplinary and rhetorical. However, we seem to part company in our understanding of the scientific character of biblical criticism. In a very engaging article on "Social-Scientific Criticism and Literary Studies," which came to my

attention through one of his footnotes, he seeks to map such an interdisciplinary rhetorical model of biblical studies. His response to my book again and again expresses his concern for scientific comprehensiveness. I can assure him that my rhetorical-emancipatory program applies to all areas of early Christian studies. It is not only interested in reconstructing both the dominant and the marginal voices but also to bring to the table of biblical studies as many different voices and disciplines as possible in order to develop critical biblical discourses of emancipation and justice. However, it is not just personal experience of struggle and emancipation but experience sifted through the analytic discourses of domination, or kyriarchy and those of justice and equality, i.e. of ekklesia that enable scholars to produce different scholarly discourses. To respond to one of his queries in his 4th area of questions these two analytic and discursive conceptualizations – kyriarchy and ekklesia – must be utilized as lenses to sift through all the various traditions that can be traced on form-critical or other methodological grounds.

I was somewhat puzzled that Prof. Robbins is missing deliberative rhetoric in my project because as Prof. Humphrey recognizes deliberative rhetoric is central to it. She correctly observes: “Deliberation is only one mode of rhetoric: where is there room in this book for legitimate epideictic and forensic discourse? All is subsumed under power and ethics.” Deliberative and not primarily judicial rhetoric is at the heart of the ekklesia of scholars who work within the rhetorical-emancipatory paradigm that I am advocating. Hence, I am interested in shaping rhetorical studies as a “new” science that is political, interdisciplinary, multicultural and oriented toward the work of justice and emancipation.

It is well known that biblical studies emerged on the scene together with other disciplines in the humanities that sought to articulate their discourses as scientific

practices in analogy to the natural sciences. The feminist theorist Sandra Harding has pointed to a three-stage process in the emergence of modern science shaping and determining scholarly discourses, their presuppositions and intellectual frameworks.⁶

The first stage, according to Harding, consisted in the breakdown of feudal labor divisions and slave relations. This breakdown made the scientific method of experimental observation possible. The traditional division between intellectuals and landed aristocracy, and those who worked with their hands, no longer pertained. This traditional division between clergy and laity prevailed much longer in theology and church.

The second stage is exemplified in the New Science Movement of the 17th century that flourished in Puritan England and brought forth a new political self-consciousness with radical social goals. “Science’s progressiveness was perceived to lie not in method alone but in its mutually supportive relationship to progressive tendencies in the larger society.”⁷ Scientific knowledge was to serve the people and to be used for redistributing knowledge and wealth. The radical goals of this New Science Movement are summed up in the following statement of Harding:

The Baconian reform movement linked and identified the New Learning with moral, educational, and social aspects. In all the social utopias of the period, the learned societies of the new philosophy...are regarded as the basis for a reconstruction of social life...Reflection upon the effects of science is part of a condition for science itself.⁸

It is this second stage of the “new” science as the basis for a reconstruction of social and religious life in the global village that I seek to recover for biblical discourses.

The third stage in the development of science produced according to Harding the notion of a purely technical and value-neutral science. (This comes to the fore in the present election debacle where machines are valued over people, which leads to a government of machines, by machines, and for machines!) The progress which science represents is based entirely on scientific method. The emergence of this 3rd stage in the development of science also spelled the end of the collaboration between science and social, political, or educational reform -- a price paid for institutionalization and political protection. The institutionalization of science meant the separation of science's cognitive and political aims and the restriction of true science and scientists to the former.

The discipline of biblical studies is located at this 3rd stage that constructs a sharp dualism between science and theology, or scientific discourse and ideology, in order to prove itself as scientific. A series of structuring dualisms and dichotomies between science and politics, history and theology, knowledge and fiction, past and present, rationality and faith, male and female, white and black, Caucasian and Asian, and so on, determine the western scientific world view of this 3rd stage. Biblical studies discourses re-inscribe such structuring dualisms as a series of methodological dichotomies and oppositions. As a scientific discourse biblical studies thus participates in the discourses of domination, which were produced by science.

For it is also at this 3rd stage of the development of academic scientific disciplines that the discourses of domination – racism, heterosexism, colonialism, class privilege, ageism -- were articulated as “scientific” discourses.⁹ While previously discourses of colonization were developed on the grounds of Christian religion, now science takes the place of religion and continues its work of hegemonic legitimization. Hence, “soft”

academic disciplines such as history, sociology, and anthropology, in their formative stage, developed discourses of domination in order to prove that they also belonged to the “hard” masculine sciences. Thereby academic social-science disciplines supported European colonialism and capitalist industrial development.

It is this 3rd stage of technologized science and biblical studies that I find so problematic and that is best labeled as scientist rather than scientific. Consequently the interdisciplinary-rhetorical emancipatory paradigm insists on the articulation of a new and different scientific discourse of biblical studies. In order to be able to recapture the goal of the 2nd stage of the “new” science biblical studies need to be transformed in terms of the rhetorical –emancipatory paradigm for which I have argued throughout this book.

In short, I do not understand the rhetorical-critical program as a primarily theological rather than scientific enterprise nor do I argue that it “must be guided by ‘theology’ rather than social analysis, cultural analysis, historical analysis, or textual analysis” (Robbins). Rather I argue for a “new” scientific self-understanding of biblical rhetorical studies that is able to produce radical (not liberal) democratic, emancipatory knowledge which is supportive of progressive tendencies in society and religion and serves the people rather than those in power. Such a critical challenge of the emancipatory paradigm to scientific biblical scholarship is expressed in “The Open Letter to the Academy” of the feminist writer Michelle Russel:

The question is this: How will you refuse to let the academy separate the dead from the living, and then yourself declare allegiance to life? As teachers, scholars and students, how available will you make your knowledge to others as tools for their own liberation? This is not a call for mindless activism, but rather for engaged scholarship.¹⁰

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- ¹ My response comments on the original papers as presented at and does not take into account any edited versions of the papers.
- ² Making Men. Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1995), XII
- ³ Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace, A Foucault Primer. Discourse, Power and the Subject (New York: NY University Press.), 42.
- ⁴ Fernando Segovia, “Re-Reading a Classic: Schüssler Fiorenza’s ‘The Ethics of Interpretation,’” presented on Saturday November 18th in the “Academic Freedom and the Public Character of Biblical Scholarship” session chaired by Prof. Ronald Troxel.
- ⁵ Adrienne Rich, “Notes Toward a Politics of Location,” in Blood, Bread and Poetry: Selected Prose 1979-1985 (New York: Norton, 1986), 227.
- ⁶ Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 218 with reference to Edgar Zilsel, “The Sociological Roots of Science,” American Journal of Sociology 47 (1942).
- ⁷ Sandra Harding, ibid. , 219.
- ⁸ Wolfgang van den Daele, “The Social Construction of Science,” in The Social Production of Scientific Knowledge ed. Everett Mendelsohn, Peter Weingart, Richard Whitley (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977), 38.
- ⁹ See Ronald T. Takaki, “Aesclepius Was a White Man: Race and the Cult of True Womanhood,” in The Racial Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future, ed. by Sandra Harding (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993) 201-09; Nancy Leys Stepan and Sander L. Gilman, “Appropriating the Idioms of Science: The Rejection of Scientific Racism,” ibid. 170-93, and Nancy Leys Stepan, “Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in Science, ibid., 369-76.
- ¹⁰ Michelle Russell, “An Open Letter to the Academy,” Quest 3(1977) 77f.